




How Well is Fair Workweek Working? A Review of Existing Research

Executive Summary

Work schedule instability and unpredictability have been identified as critical threats to hourly workers' well-being, on and off the job. In response, over the past decade, policymakers have advanced Fair Workweek (FWW) laws to regulate these labor practices and to secure more stable and predictable schedules for hourly workers. Since San Francisco's adoption of the first FWW policy in 2015, 8 municipalities and 1 state have followed suit and implemented their own regulations intended to discourage employers from engaging in "just-in-time" scheduling practices and to help underemployed workers secure more work hours. While there is room for further research on the intended and unintended consequences of these statutes, a growing body of quantitative evidence offers several valuable insights that can inform future policymaking. Reviewing rigorous studies of the effects of FWW laws, we find:

1. FWW policies can broadly reduce covered workers' exposure to precarious scheduling practices, including having short notice of their work schedules or being assigned on-call shifts.

2. There is no conclusive evidence that FWW laws have had any negative impact on workers' number of work hours or on total employment in targeted industries.
3. While less comprehensively studied, FWW policies appear to have positive impacts on workers' downstream outcomes, namely improving sleep quality and reducing the experience of material hardship.

Fair Workweek Laws: An Overview

Work is fundamental to economic security and well-being, but on-the-job conditions are deeply unequal. Millions of working people, especially in hourly positions, face low wages, limited benefits, and work schedules that are often unstable and unpredictable. This temporal precarity takes the form of an array of scheduling practices including limited advance notice of schedules, on-call shifts, last-minute changes or cancellations, and week-to-week volatility in work hours. These practices are especially widespread in the service sector. Drawing on data collected from food service, retail, logistics, and hospitality workers between 2023 and 2025, prior research from the

Shift Project details that 59% of workers in the service sector regularly received their work schedules with less than two weeks' advance notice; 26% worked an on-call shift in the past month; 42% worked "clopening" (consecutive opening and closing) shifts; 63% had the timing of a shift changed; and 15% had a shift entirely canceled. Nearly 9 in 10 workers were subject to at least one of those five precarious scheduling practices.

A growing body of research demonstrates that instability and unpredictability are detrimental to workers' physical and mental health. Such schedules heighten work-life conflict (e.g., [Henly & Lambert 2014](#)), reduce sleep quality (e.g., [Harknett et al. 2020a](#), [Ananat & Gassman-Pines 2021](#)), and increase household financial fragility (e.g., [Schneider & Harknett 2021a](#)). The negative effects of work schedule precarity extend beyond the affected workers themselves, as it makes arranging high-quality childcare more difficult for working parents ([Carrillo et al. 2017](#), [Harknett et al. 2020b](#)) and is associated with more externalizing ("mad") and internalizing ("sad") behaviors among their children ([Schneider & Harknett 2021b](#)).

While legislation to regulate work scheduling at the federal level, including the [Schedules that Work Act](#) and the [Part-Time Worker Bill of Rights](#), has not been enacted, in recent years many states and localities across the country have passed innovative legislation to regulate these practices. In 2015, San Francisco became the first jurisdiction in the United States to implement a "Fair Workweek" law in an attempt to reduce workers' exposures to unstable and unpredictable scheduling practices. Nine additional jurisdictions have since implemented their own FWW policies. While each FWW law varies with respect to which workers are covered and what protections they are entitled to, common provisions include:

- Requiring advance notice of work schedule, usually 14 days
- Compensation for on-call shifts for which workers are never called in and/or for canceled/reduced shifts
- Compensation for shift timing changes made with short notice
- The right to refuse clopening shifts, and extra pay if accepted
- "Access to hours," guaranteeing current workers' claim to additional hours before their employer makes new hires

We detail the provisions of each existing FWW policy in Table 1. There is a high degree of uniformity across the laws. While Oregon, Philadelphia, and Chicago

phased in the advance notice requirement, at full implementation, all of the ordinances require 14 days' notice (with the exception of New York City's coverage of retail workers). All of the ordinances also require predictability pay, though there is some variation in the amount due across jurisdictions. All of the laws except for San Francisco's FWW policy and New York City's FWW policy for retail workers also regulate clopening shifts by providing a right to decline them and an entitlement to bonus pay if they are worked. The laws differ more markedly in which workers are covered by the ordinance, with most focused on retail and food service, but some, such as Chicago's, covering a broader range of workers.

The Quantitative Evidence Base

Researchers have employed a variety of data sources to estimate the impacts of Fair Workweek laws. These include public administrative data, like the Quarterly Workforce Indicators compiled by the Census Bureau (Gruber et al. 2026); private administrative data from affected firms (Kwon & Raman 2023); longstanding government surveys, like the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (Pickens & Sojourner 2025); and surveys of workers administered by researchers, like the Shift Project survey (Harknett et al. 2021; Bruey et al. 2026; Schneider et al. 2026). These different data sources have different strengths and inherently lend themselves to analysis of different outcomes. For example, custom surveys can generally offer the most detailed measures of individual workers' schedule quality as well as of downstream well-being outcomes, but they are not well-suited to detect employment effects and may suffer from limited statistical power relative to analyses that draw on large-scale government surveys.

The methods employed to estimate the causal impact of FWW policies also vary between studies, but most rely on difference-in-differences designs. With this approach, the changes that occur to a treatment group (i.e., covered workers) after an FWW policy is enacted are compared to any changes that might have occurred to a control group (e.g., workers in an uncovered industry or uncovered jurisdiction) over the same period. This effectively accounts for any time trends in outcomes of interest that would have occurred even in the absence of the new policy. However, this method requires data on both the treatment and the control groups before and after policy implementation. This is a tall order when it comes to novel data and is not always possible.

Table 1. Fair Workweek Laws: Provisions by Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction	First implemented	Fully enforced	Covered industries	Advance notice (days)	Predictability pay			Clopening	
					<i>Timing changed</i>	<i>Shift canceled/reduced</i>	<i>On-call</i>	<i>Hour buffer</i>	<i>Reqs.</i>
San Francisco, CA	Jan. 2015	Jul. 2015	Retail, food service	14	1-4 hours pay per instance	1-4 hours pay per instance	2-4 hours pay if not called in	N/A	
Seattle, WA	Jul. 2017	Jan. 2018	Retail, food service	14	1 hour pay per instance	0.5x pay of lost hours	0.5x pay of hours not worked	10	Right to decline, 1.5x pay if accepted
Oregon	Aug. 2017	Jan. 2019	Retail, food service, hospitality	7	1 hour pay per instance	0.5x pay of lost hours	0.5x pay of hours not worked	10	Right to decline, 1.5x pay if accepted
	Aug. 2018			14					
Emeryville, CA	Jul. 2017	Jan. 2018	Retail, food service	14	1 hour pay per instance	1-4 hours pay per instance	No pay for not being called in, same predictability pay as for regular shifts	11	Right to decline, 1.5x pay if accepted
New York City, NY	Nov. 2017		Retail	3	Up to \$500 per instance			N/A	
			Fast food	14	\$10-\$15 bonus per instance	\$20-\$75 bonus per instance	No pay for not being called in, same predictability pay as for regular shifts	11	Right to decline, \$100 bonus per instance if accepted
Philadelphia, PA	Apr. 2020	Jun. 2021	Retail, food service, hospitality	10	1 hour pay per instance	0.5x pay of lost hours	0.5x pay of hours not worked	9	Right to decline, \$40 bonus per instance if accepted
	Jan. 2021			14					
Chicago, IL	Jul. 2020	Jan. 2021	Retail, food service, healthcare, hospitality, warehouse, construction, manufacturing	10	1 hour pay per instance	1 hour pay per instance, or 0.5x pay of lost hours if <24 hours' notice	No pay for not being called in, same predictability pay as for regular shifts	10	Right to decline, 1.25x pay if accepted
	Jul. 2022			14					
Los Angeles, CA	Apr. 2023 (expanded to entire county in Jul. 2025)	Sep. 2023	Retail	14	1 hour pay per instance	0.5x pay of lost hours	0.5x pay of hours not worked	10	Right to decline, 1.5x pay if accepted
Evanston, IL	Sep. 2023	Jan. 2024	Retail, food service, hospitality, warehouse, construction, manufacturing	14	1 hour pay per instance	1-4 hours pay per instance	Up to 4 hours pay per shift not worked	11	Right to decline, 1.5x pay if accepted
Berkeley, CA	Jan. 2024		Retail, food service, healthcare, hospitality, warehouse, construction, manufacturing	14	1 hour pay per instance	1-4 hours pay per instance	No pay for not being called in, same predictability pay as for regular shifts	11	Right to decline, 1.5x pay if accepted

Starting in 2021, fast food employers in NYC must maintain “regular schedules” for employees based on their availability and cannot reduce their hours by more than 15% without either worker consent or a “bona fide economic reason.”

Table 2. Quantitative Studies on the Effects of Fair Workweek Laws

Authors	Year	FWW locations studied	Methods	Main outcomes	Strengths	Limitations
K. Harknett, D. Schneider, V. Irwin [†]	2021	Seattle	Difference-in-differences (using workers in similar metropolitan areas as comparison) + instrumental variables model	Advance notice, shift changes/cancelations, working on-call, clopening shifts, well-being & economic hardship	Worker-employer matched data structure	Limited pre-treatment data for assessing trends
E. O. Ananat, A. Gassman-Pines, J. A. Fitz-Henley [†]	2022	Emeryville	Difference-in-differences with individual fixed effects (using Emeryville workers at uncovered workplaces as comparison)	Schedule changes, work days & hours, parental & child well-being	Longitudinal data structure, sample constitutes large share of entire target population, granularity of daily scheduling outcomes	Limited statistical power, sample exclusively comprised of working parents
A. Yelowitz	2022	San Francisco, Seattle, Oregon, New York City	Staggered difference-in-differences	Working part-time vs. full-time	Can utilize CPS measures re: why workers transition between part-time & full-time work	Imprecision in identifying covered vs. uncovered workers, potential biases of staggered DID design
C. Kwon, A. Raman	2023	Philadelphia, Chicago, Los Angeles	Difference-in-differences (using untreated neighboring areas as comparison)	Advance notice, consistency in shift timing, number of shifts & work minutes	Large sample, uniquely detailed measures of schedule changes in admin. data	Only 3 employers represented in sample
J. Pickens, A. J. Sojourner [†]	2025	New York City	Synthetic difference-in-differences (within-location and within-industry specifications)	Total employment	Large sample & high statistical power	Imprecision in identifying covered vs. uncovered workers
S. J. Lambert, J. R. Henly, H. Cho, R. Swanson-Varner, Y. He	2025	Seattle, New York City, Chicago	Multivariate modeling + comparing post-treatment means between treated areas & untreated neighboring areas	Advance notice, pay for changed & closely spaced shifts	Detailed measures of FWW compliance	Relies on post-treatment comparisons between covered/uncovered workers without pre-treatment data
A. Gruber [†]	2026	Oregon	Within- and between-state difference-in-differences models	Employment, work hours, monthly earnings	Only study to consider heterogeneity of effects by gender	Imprecision in identifying covered vs. uncovered workers
K. Bruey, A. Soto, D. Schneider, K. Harknett	2026	Los Angeles	Difference-in-differences (using uncovered retail workers in rest of California as comparison)	Advance notice, shift changes/cancelations, working on-call, clopening shifts	Worker-employer matched data structure	Large standard errors arising from limited statistical power
D. Schneider, K. Harknett, D. Arbeláez [†]	2026	Seattle, Oregon, New York City, Philadelphia, Chicago	Stacked & weighted difference-in-differences (using workers in untreated jurisdictions but matching industries as comparison)	Advance notice, shift changes/cancelations, working on-call, clopening shifts, usual work hours	Worker-employer matched data structure, robust quantitative methods, considers possible channels of adjustment	Monthly schedule instability outcomes may not fully capture changes in the intensity of exposures


[†] Published in peer-reviewed journal

Effects on Schedule Predictability & Stability

One provision shared among all ten Fair Workweek laws is a requirement that employers provide workers with advance notice—usually 14 days—of their schedules and offer compensation for any schedule changes that may occur with shorter

notice. Four studies attempt to estimate the effects of FWW policies on workers’ advance notice of their schedules, and they all find that such policies succeed in improving schedule predictability.

Figure 1. Effects of Fair Workweek Laws on Advance Notice of Work Schedule



Harknett et al. (2021), Bruey et al. (2026), and Schneider et al. (2026) estimate the percentage point change in the share of workers reporting at least two weeks’ advance notice, whereas Lambert et al. (2025) estimate the percentage change in odds of a worker receiving at least two weeks’ advance and Kwon & Raman (2023) estimate the percentage change in number of days of advance notice. The presented Lambert et al. estimate comes from their “Full Model” specification, which controls for the most covariates.

Harknett et al. (2021) estimate an 11 p.p. increase in workers' likelihood of receiving at least two weeks' notice after Seattle enacted its FWW ordinance, and Bruey et al. (2026) find an even greater increase (18 p.p.) for retail workers newly covered by Los Angeles' FWW policy. Meanwhile, Schneider et al. (2026) aggregate the impacts of 5 separate FWW policies (Seattle, Oregon, New York, City, Philadelphia, & Chicago) and estimate a 13 p.p. increase in the share of workers receiving at least two weeks' notice. Lambert et al. (2025) also aggregate effects across multiple FWW jurisdictions (Seattle, New York City, & Chicago) and find that workers covered by these cities' secure scheduling regulations were 26% more likely to receive at least two weeks' notice as compared to uncovered workers in neighboring areas. However, they find that this overall effect is largely driven by Seattle's FWW ordinance specifically. Kwon & Raman (2023) separately estimate the effects of the FWW laws for workers employed at one of three large employers and find that FWW policies led to increases in workers' average number of days of advance notice at these three companies. However, they observe significant heterogeneity in effect magnitude across the studied jurisdictions (+6% in Philadelphia & Los Angeles vs. +35% in Chicago), which the authors speculate could be attributed to differential pre-FWW norms in scheduling practices between jurisdictions and/or Chicago's contemporaneous minimum wage increase.

In addition to increases in advance notice, the quantitative Fair Workweek evaluation literature broadly finds that these laws yield reductions in the prevalence of several precarious scheduling practices, although measurement of these practices is not well harmonized across studies. Relative to workers in comparable metropolitan areas, Harknett et al. (2021) identify statistically significant declines in the share of Seattle workers reporting shift cancelations (7 p.p.), timing changes (9 p.p.), and clopening shifts (6 p.p.) in the past month, whereas Bruey et al. (2026) find generally larger effects of Los Angeles' FWW


ordinance on a similar array of outcomes, though less precisely estimated. Aggregating the effects of five different FWW policies, Schneider et al. (2026) estimate an 8 p.p. decline in having worked a clopening shift in the prior month and a 7 p.p. decline in having a shift timing changed, with no statistically significant effects on the likelihoods of having a shift canceled or working an on-call shift.

Ananat et al. (2022) consider a similar array of indicators of schedule instability, although they conduct analyses at the more granular person-job-day level. They find that Emeryville's FWW policy reduced the likelihood of a covered worker experiencing a last-minute timing change (-3 p.p.), a surprise shift (-2 p.p.), or overall any schedule change (-4 p.p.) on a given day, with no statistically significant effect on shift cancelations specifically. Lambert et al. (2025) similarly do not find evidence of an effect on shift cancelations, but they do identify a 40% increase in the odds of workers' being paid for "closely spaced" (i.e., separated by fewer than 10 or 11 hours, as determined by that municipality's respective FWW policy) shifts.


Kwon & Raman (2023) are unique in measuring "shift stability," which they operationalize with three outcomes: consistency in the days worked each week, consistency in the start times of shifts worked on the same day of the week, and consistency in the start times of shifts worked on consecutive days. Of note, New York City's FWW policy for fast food workers is the only that contains provisions directly regulating shift stability as defined by these measures, but improving shift stability is nonetheless an objective of FWW advocates across jurisdictions and may indirectly result from the provisions promoting shift predictability. However, Kwon & Raman do not find evidence of any change in the consistency of the days or times of workers' shifts stemming from the Chicago, Philadelphia, or Los Angeles FWW policies.

Figure 2. Effects of Fair Workweek Laws on Other Scheduling Outcomes

Harknett et al. (2021)
Seattle
Outcomes: monthly basis



Ananat et al. (2022)
Emeryville
Outcomes: daily basis




Kwon & Raman (2023)
Philadelphia, Chicago, Los Angeles




Bruey et al. (2026)
Los Angeles
Outcomes: monthly basis



Schneider et al. (2026)
Seattle, Oregon, New York City, Philadelphia, & Chicago
Outcomes: monthly basis



Lambert et al. (2025)
Seattle, New York City, Chicago



Note from Figure 2: Lambert et al. (2025) estimate the percentage changes in odds of a worker experiencing each scheduling outcome, whereas Harknett et al. (2021), Ananat et al. (2022), Kwon & Raman (2023), Bruey et al. (2026), and Schneider et al. (2026) estimate percentage point changes. Scheduling outcomes estimated by Ananat et al. are measured on a daily basis as opposed to a monthly basis (as in Harknett et al. 2021, Bruey et al. 2026, & Schneider et al. 2026). Kwon & Raman define “shift stability” as a) consistency in the days of the week that workers are scheduled to work, b) consistency in the start times of workers’ shifts on the same day of the week, and c) consistency in the start times of workers’ shifts on back-to-back days. The presented Ananat et al. estimates come from their models specified to maximize pooled post-period data. The presented Lambert et al. estimates come from their “Full Model” specification, which controls for the most covariates.

Effects on Hours and Employment

Beyond schedule instability and unpredictability, many service sector workers also grapple with being unable to secure sufficient work hours to financially support themselves and their families (e.g., [Golden & Kim 2020](#)). To address this issue of hour insufficiency, many FWW policies include “access to hours” provisions that guarantee current employees the opportunity to take on more work hours before new hires are made. However, critics of FWW laws suggest that disincentivizing managers from making last-minute changes to workers’ schedules may encourage them to simply schedule workers for fewer days and hours to begin with—undercutting the intended effects of the access to hours provisions. This possible employer response is an example of “channels of adjustment,” through which employers may try to offset the costs of complying with regulations like FWW protections. Taken together, then, there are contrasting expectations; a channels of adjustment-focused perspective might suggest negative effects on work hours for the current workforce, while compliance with access to hours provisions would suggest positive effects on hours while potentially reducing new hires.

Lambert et al. (2025) attempt to directly assess the impacts of these policies’ access to hours provisions. They find that a majority of workers in three FWW jurisdictions (Chicago, Seattle, and New York City) as well as workers in neighboring non-FWW jurisdictions were offered more hours before new employees were hired—with no statistically significant difference between the two—but do not have pre-implementation data to more directly identify a potential causal effect. Also taking up the question of work hours, Ananat et al. (2022) find null effects of Emeryville’s FWW law on covered workers’ total hours worked, the combined result of a

reduction in the likelihood of working any given day but an increase in average hours per day. Schneider et al. (2026) reaffirm this result, not identifying a statistically significant effect of FWW policies on workers’ number of usual weekly work hours—nor on other possible channels of adjustment, like wages or access to employer-sponsored benefits. Kwon & Raman (2023) similarly find that there were no impacts of the FWW policies in Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles on total labor minutes or shifts, although they do find a 12% reduction in new hiring in Philadelphia. In contrast, Yelowitz (2022) suggests that a collection of four FWW laws (San Francisco, Seattle, New York City, & Oregon) produced a large increase (9 p.p.) in part-time work as opposed to full-time work.

Pickens & Sojourner (2025) find no evidence that New York City’s FWW law for fast food workers impacted total employment in the local fast food sector. Gruber (2026) similarly does not find evidence that Oregon’s FWW law had an aggregate effect on employment or work hours in the retail or grocery sectors but does identify heterogeneous impacts by gender: a positive effect on men’s employment and hours and a negative effect on women’s employment and hours. It is suggested that these disparate effects could arise from a perception among managers that men are more reliable to schedule within the regulatory constraints of Oregon’s FWW policy, and/or that men may be more likely to tolerate unlawful just-in-time scheduling practices after the policy’s implementation.

In sum, there is no decisive evidence that FWW laws’ access to hours provisions ultimately increased the number of hours available to covered workers, nor is there decisive evidence that they triggered

channels of adjustment that reduced hours or total employment. Note, however, that the effects of these provisions are likely limited by the relatively lenient nature of the requirements by which employers must abide. For example, Los Angeles' FWW law only gives workers 72 hours to take advantage of the access to hours guarantee before their employer is permitted to make a new hire. Additionally, employers may only have to make workers aware of the opportunity to request more hours through means as subtle as a bulletin posting, rather than via direct notification. If these provisions are to more effectively address the issue of hour insufficiency, stricter implementation requirements may be necessary.

Effects on Wellbeing

The primary goals of Fair Workweek laws were to increase notice of work schedules and reduce last-minute timing changes and clopening shifts and to offer access to more weekly hours. Given a large body of research connecting these schedule conditions to worker well-being and economic security, improvements to work scheduling conditions have the potential for downstream benefits.

Just two studies consider the potential impacts of FWW policies on downstream outcomes that reflect workers' overall well-being. Harknett et al. (2021) estimate that Seattle's FWW ordinance led to an 11 p.p. increase in "very good" or "good" (as opposed to "fair" or "poor") sleep; a 7 p.p. increase in being "very happy" or "pretty happy" (as opposed to "not too happy"); and a 10 p.p. reduction in the likelihood of experiencing one or more of six types of material hardships. However, they do not identify a statistically significant effect on the prevalence of psychological distress among covered workers. Ananat et al. (2022) reaffirm the finding of a positive effect of FWW laws on sleep quality, finding a reduction in parental sleep difficulty while not finding evidence of effects on other outcomes capturing psychological well-being like mood. Given that FWW laws do appear to broadly ease work schedule precarity, these findings are consistent with robust prior research indicating that schedule instability is associated with worse mental and physical health outcomes.

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Appendix

Harknett, K., Schneider, D., and Irwin, V. (2021). “Improving Health and Economic Security by Reducing Work Schedule Uncertainty.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 118(42): e2107828118. doi: 10.1073/pnas.2107828118.

- FWW location(s) studied: Seattle
- **Data:** Workers at large service sector firms who completed the online Shift Project survey (nonprobability sample recruited through Facebook & Instagram ads targeted on basis of self-reported employer)
- **Methods:** Difference-in-differences design (using workers at the same large employers as covered Seattle workers but at worksites in different major cities as the comparison group) + an instrumental variable approach identifying impacts on downstream well-being outcomes
- **Key findings:** Seattle’s FWW ordinance increased the share of workers getting at least two weeks’ notice of their schedule (by 11 p.p.), but almost half still reported less than two weeks’ notice, suggesting widespread noncompliance. It also reduced instances of shift timing changes without pay (by 13 p.p.), and there is suggestive evidence it also reduced the prevalence of on-call shifts and clopening shifts. The instrumental variable analysis indicates that these improvements in schedule quality improve workers’ sleep quality and reduce their experience of material hardship.
- **Limitations:** The relatively limited data before FWW ordinance implementation does not allow for assessment of potentially variable pre-trends between treatment and control jurisdictions. The monthly schedule instability outcomes may not capture changes in the intensity of exposures to just-in-time scheduling practices.

Ananat, E. O., Gassman-Pines, A., and Fitz-Henley, J. A. (2022). “The Effects of the Emeryville Fair Workweek Ordinance on the Daily Lives of Low-Wage Workers and Their Families.” *RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences* 8(5): 45-66. doi: 10.7758/RSF.2022.8.5.03.

- FWW location(s) studied: Emeryville
- **Data:** 3 waves of longitudinal survey data collected from convenience sample of 96 hourly workers in Emeryville with a child age 2-7 (some covered by the FWW ordinance and some not)
- **Methods:** Difference-in-differences design
- **Key findings:** Emeryville’s FWO reduced work days but increased hours per day at covered worksites, yielding an insignificant overall change in weekly work hours, and it decreased the likelihood of workers experiencing schedule changes, especially surprise shifts. The policy also led to significant reductions in parental sleep difficulty.
- **Limitations:** The relatively small sample size (N = 78) for longitudinal analyses reduces statistical power, and the sample is exclusively comprised of working parents, who may differ from the broader population of hourly workers.

Yelowitz, A. (2022). “Predictive Scheduling Laws Do Not Promote Full-Time Work.” *University of Kentucky, Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise. Working Paper 46.*

- **FWW location(s) studied:** San Francisco, Seattle, Oregon, New York City
- **Data:** Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC), 2014-2020
- **Methods:** Difference-in-differences design, using retail/food/hospitality workers in California, New York state, & Washington state as a comparison group
- **Key findings:** Among workers, FWW policies led to an increase in part-time work (9 p.p.). This is mostly driven by an increase in involuntary part-time work, suggesting that employers scaled back schedules to comply with the new regulations.
- **Limitations:** Analysis relies on the assumption that individuals’ workplaces are in the same municipality in which they live. It also relies on NAICS industry codes to proxy for treatment status and only considers the firm size variable available in the CPS (which may not be highly accurate) as a determinant of FWW coverage in certain models.

Kwon, C., and Raman, A. (2023). “The Real Effects of Fair Workweek Laws on Work Schedules: Evidence from Chicago, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia.” *Harvard Business School. Working Paper.*

- **FWW location(s) studied:** Philadelphia, Chicago, Los Angeles
- **Data:** Private administrative data from 3 large retail chains with information about all hourly workers’ shifts (start time, duration, task)
- **Methods:** Difference-in-differences design (using workers just outside of the covered jurisdictions as the comparison group) + triple difference designs to examine heterogeneity on the basis of gender, wage, and part-time vs. full-time status
- **Key findings:** In all three FWW-covered cities, there were increases in advance notice of work schedules (35% in Chicago, 6% in Los Angeles, 6% in Philadelphia). However, there was no evidence of improvements in the consistency of workers’ schedules (i.e., which days of the week are worked and what times of day are worked) from week to week. There was also no evidence of adverse impacts on the number of scheduled shifts or work minutes, or of heterogeneity of the policies’ impacts on the basis of worker wages (but mixed evidence of potential heterogeneity on the basis of gender and part-time vs. full-time status).
- **Limitations:** Analytic sample is comprised of only three large retailers, limiting external validity. Administrative data does not allow for differentiation between employer-driven instability and worker-driven requests for flexibility.

Pickens, J., and Sojourner, A. J. (2025). “Effects of Fair Workweek Laws on Labor Market Outcomes.” *Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society.* doi: 10.1111/irel.70000.

- **FWW location(s) studied:** New York City (fast food), with secondary analyses examining Oregon & New York City (retail)
- **Data:** Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) data on workers in limited-service restaurants
- **Methods:** Synthetic difference-in-differences design, comparing the New York City fast food sector to other industries in New York City & the fast food sector in other counties
- **Key findings:** There is no evidence of an employment effect of the New York City FWW regulations for fast food workers, although this could be partially driven by employer noncompliance.
- **Limitations:** The estimation approach is potentially biased by the assumption that all New York City fast food workers are covered by the law and cannot capture potential spillover employment effects in other industries.

Lambert, S. J., Henly, J. R., Cho, H., Swanson-Varner, R., and He, Y. (2025). “How Are Municipal-Level Fair Workweek Laws Playing Out on the Ground? Experiences of Food Service and Retail Workers in Three Cities.” *Washington Center for Equitable Growth. Working Paper.*

- **FWW location(s) studied:** Seattle, New York City, Chicago
- **Data:** Qualtrics survey panel of 1,781 retail & food service workers
- **Methods:** Comparing scheduling outcomes between workers at covered firms within city limits to workers at uncovered firms in adjacent areas, using descriptive means as well as multivariate modeling
- **Key findings:** As compared to workers not covered by such policies, workers covered under FWW regulations were more likely to receive extra pay after agreeing to work a different or extended shift and after agreeing to work “closely spaced” shifts. They also were more likely to receive advance notice in accordance with the local FWW policy, although this effect was driven by the Seattle subsample specifically (and a majority of workers in Chicago and New York City still report less than two weeks’ notice). Workers at covered and uncovered worksites received compensation for shift cancellations and hour reductions at similar rates.
- **Limitations:** The absence of data before FWW implementation limits causal interpretation of results.

Gruber, A. (2026). “The Labor Market Impacts of Fair Work Legislation.” *ILR Review* 79(1): 59-90. doi: 10.1177/00197939251355234.

- **FWW location(s) studied:** Oregon
- **Data:** Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) and American Community Survey (ACS)
- **Methods:** Two difference-in-differences designs, one within-state and one across-state (inc. versions with synthetic controls)
- **Key findings:** In some models, there is evidence of small increases in male employment, hours, and average monthly earnings at grocery & food service establishments but decreases in female employment, hours, and average monthly earnings (especially for new hires). In sum, Oregon’s FWW law may have led to compositional changes in this sector, but there is no evidence of an aggregate effect on employment or hours.
- **Limitations:** Some workers considered treated by the FWW law are likely not truly covered, as the analytic approach is unable to fully exclude salaried workers.

Bruey, K., Soto, A., Schneider, D., and Harknett, K. (2026). “Unpredictable and Unstable: Fast Food Jobs in Los Angeles.” *Shift Project Research Brief.*

- **FWW location(s) studied:** Los Angeles
- **Data:** 1,478 retail workers at large service sector firms in California who completed the online Shift Project survey (nonprobability sample recruited through Facebook & Instagram ads targeted on basis of self-reported employer)
- **Methods:** Difference-in-differences design, using retail workers throughout the rest of California (in untreated jurisdictions) as the comparison group
- **Key findings:** Los Angeles’ FWW law led to significant reductions in the share of retail workers reporting less than two weeks’ advance notice of their schedule (18 p.p.), having worked on-call in the past month (22 p.p.), having a shift canceled in the past month (17 p.p.), and having worked clopening shifts in the past month (32 p.p.). However, there is no evidence of the law leading to a reduction in the share of workers reporting a change in shift timing in the past month.
- **Limitations:** The relatively small sample of FWW-covered workers reduces precision of effect size estimates. The monthly schedule instability outcomes may not capture changes in the intensity of exposures to just-in-time scheduling practices.

Schneider, D., Harknett, K., and Arbeláez, D. (2026). “Fair Workweek Laws in the U.S.: An Appraisal of Intended and Unintended Consequences.” *Science Advances* 12 (26). doi:10.1126/sciadv.aea8632.

- FWW location(s) studied: Seattle, Oregon, New York City, Philadelphia, Chicago
- Data: 87,123 workers at large service sector firms who completed the online Shift Project survey (nonprobability sample recruited through Facebook & Instagram ads targeted on basis of self-reported employer)
- Methods: Stacked sub-experiment difference-in-differences design per [Wing et al. \(2024\)](#) using workers in matching industries but untreated jurisdictions across the country as comparison group
 - Also checks robustness to coarsened exact matching and [Callaway-Sant’Anna \(2021\)](#) approaches
- Key findings: FWW policies increased covered workers’ likelihood of receiving at least two weeks’ notice of their work schedules (13 p.p.) and reduced their likelihood of having worked a clopening shift (8 p.p.) or having a shift timing changed (7 p.p.) in the past month. There were no statistically significant effects on shift cancelations, on-call shifts, or workers’ usual weekly work hours. However, there is significant heterogeneity in these effects across the 5 individual FWW policies. There is no evidence that employers adjusted to FWW laws by reducing workers’ wages or access to employer-sponsored benefits.
- Limitations: The monthly schedule instability outcomes may not capture changes in the intensity of exposures to just-in-time scheduling practices.